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Developing a discursive psychology of institutions 
Over the last decade or so discursive psychology has developed as a distinct 
perspective within social psychology, psychology and social science more generally 
(Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Edwards, 2001).  One of the 
things that differentiates it from other approaches is its conceptualisation of 
psychology itself.  Most social psychological takes as at least a central topic an inner 
representation or processing system of some kind.  This is true of social cognition 
work, of social representations research, and of many strands of newer approaches to 
subjectivity.  Inner representations and processes are seen as central to 
understanding human action.  This paper is not intended to criticise this view; rather 
it will further develop a discursive psychological alternative. 
Discursive psychology takes a different approach to thinking and other 
elements of cognitive representations and processes.  It focuses on the practical role 
of representations and processes.  These things are analysed as useful resources for 
action, for getting things done.  In this it builds on the traditions of linguistic 
philosophy (and particularly Wittgenstein, 1953/1958) and ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Coulter, 1990).  However, it has moved forward from these 
traditions by drawing on the analytic resources of discourse analysis and 
conversation analysis (Drew, 2003; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Potter, 2003; ten 
Have, 1999; Wetherell, 1998). 
DP asks what is psychology for?  Why is there psychology?  What are the wide 
range of categories, constructions, orientations and so on used to do?  And the way it 
goes about studying these things is through considering the ways they figure as 
issues for the participants’ themselves.  What are people doing with psychology?  
How are they orienting to psychological displays, claims, constructions and so on?  
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How are they deploying psychological categories?  How are they constructing 
individuals, say, as sites of accountability as opposed to collectives, institutions or 
objects?  In asking these questions it starts to rework our disciplinary understanding 
of the nature of psychology. 
The points made so far are characteristic of different strands of discursive 
psychology over the past decade.  In this paper I want to push forward the discursive 
psychological project by considering how it might develop a specific approach to 
(some features of) institutions (building in part on Edwards & Potter, 2001).   That is, 
how far can discursive psychology start to provide a new way of understanding 
concrete organizations and their operation?  This is a rather different approach to 
social organization that most late C20th social psychology which aims to identify the 
operation of generic social processes, independently of institutions or historical 
settings (Gergen, 1982).  The aim in discursive psychology is to show the way 
institutions such as therapy, education, courts are characterised by specific 
‘psychological business’.  That is, how do particular psychological (or, more 
cautiously, ‘psychological’) terms and orientations have institutional roles in 
particular settings?  Indeed, how are certain central features of institutions 
constituted by the performance of this business?  I will illustrate this using a specific 
example.  
Child Protection and Concern 
The focus here will be on calls to a child protection helpline run by the 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty (NSPCC) in the UK.  This study is part 
of a broader collaborative project with Alexa Hepburn.  More details of various 
aspects of the project and its findings can be seen in Hepburn (2004) and Hepburn 
and Potter (2004).  More details of the specific material discussed here can be found 
in Potter and Hepburn (2003). 
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The child protection helpline is a central element of the NSPCC’s child 
protection strategy.  It fields more than a quarter of a million calls each year.  It is 
staffed by paid professionals who must all have had at least three years field social 
work experience.  These people have the title Child Protection Officers (henceforth 
CPOs) to highlight the central aim of the job that is to take reports of abuse and refer 
those reports to either social services or the police.  The CPOs have a statutory 
requirement to pass on all reports where there is credible evidence of abuse whatever 
the wishes of the caller.  Calls were recorded on minidisk and subsequently digitised 
for analysis.  All callers actively gave their permission for their call’s to be used for 
research and training. 
The research reported here started with an initial corpus of 40 abuse-
reporting calls (eliminating calls within the NSPCC, wrong numbers, attempts to 
donate and similar).  This was the basis for Potter & Hepburn (2003).  The current 
paper supplements this corpus with examples chosen to illustrate particular points.   
When listening to calls it is easy to overlook what happens in the first few 
moments in favour of focusing on the more dramatic aspects of the unfolding report.  
However, the openings have some elements that are particularly interesting for what 
they reveal about discourse and institutions.  In about 60% of cases the start of the 
call includes a construction that uses the term ‘concern’ or something similar.  Let 
me start with this. 
In the OED the word ‘concern’ has both an objective and subjective definition.  
It is an ‘object of concern’, a thing in the world, and it is the associated subjective or 
psychological qualities of being anxious or troubled.  These two senses are not 
independent – the subjective qualities are related to the objective, the trouble in the 
world is what the person is troubled about.  This is an interesting topic for discursive 
psychological analysis, as one of the central themes in discursive psychology is the 
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way that versions of the world and versions of psychological states are linked 
together in talk for the purposes of action (Edwards, 1997).  ‘I was really angry’ can 
be part of a moral critique;  ‘he just slapped me for no reason’ can be an account for 
upset (Edwards, 1999; Locke & Edwards, 2003).  The semantics of concern as 
presented in the OED suggest that it is a notion that brings the objective and 
subjective together in a rather tight manner.  This is a start point for analysis. 
A Canonical C-Construction 
The following example shows the canonical pattern of early actions in NSPCC 
calls.  Note that the CPO intervenes very early to initiate the ethics exchange; 
however, I have not included these sometimes lengthy exchanges here.  The call is 
transcribed using the conventions for representing talk developed by Gail Jefferson 
(these are laid out in the appendix below; for more detail see Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998; ten Have, 1999).  I am going to be most focussed on the ‘expressions of 
concern’ that appear on lines 7-13 and 17-20.  For reasons that will become clearer 
below I will refer to them as c-constructions. 
Extract 1 LB neighbour concern 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
  ((phone rings)) 
CPO:   Hello NSPCC Helpline can I help you:? 
Caller: Good after[ noon    >I   won]der if y’  
CPO:       [((clears throat))] 
  could< .hhh 
CPO:  [ Ye:s   certainly:, ] 6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Caller: [I’m concerned about-]     ←1 
(0.2)  
CPO:  Yeh, 
(0.2) 
.h 
Caller: about a child that lives next 
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13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
door to me. 
CPO:  Tk.h ri::ght, could- before you go on 
((ethics exchange)) 
CPO:  ↑O↓kay: fine yeh go on:, sorry to stop you, 
Caller: Yeah I’m- I’m concerned about °h° (0.2)  ←2 
my next door neighbours an they got a  
little girl about six. an she’s 
always cry:in’, 
(0.2) 
.Hh 
CPO:  R[i:ght,] 
Caller:  [I  can] hear them through the wa:ll now 
an mum’s shoutin at ‘er like anything. 
(0.7) 
Tk ‘I don’t want to see you get away from 
me:,’ an (0.3) °.hh° an I mean it’s  
really loud.=huh 
(0.3) 
CPO:  Ri::ght. 
Caller:  I mean I didn’ ‘ave a too brilliant  
upbringin so I w’d know what it’s li:ke 
so. Hh 
(0.4) 
CPO:  Ye- ri:ght yeah:=an this: is: something  
that you’ve >been worried about for a<  
whi:le [have you?] 
Caller:        [It  has  ] yes I’ve got a ↑friend  
who works in child protection and she’s 
told me to ri- if I’m worried, ring in. 
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 Let me start with a number of observations about certain aspects of the start of this 
call.  
First note that at line 14, after the first c-construction, the CPO does not treat 
the caller as having completed an action.  His ‘before you go on’ treats the caller as 
having more to say and being about to go on to say it.  This is reinforced by his ‘sorry 
to stop you’ on line 16, treating the caller as having been stopped from something.  
Second, note the CPO’s ‘right’ on 14 and again on line 23.  I want to highlight in 
particular what these turns are not doing.  In particular, they are not assessing the 
prior turn, nor are they moving on to new business.  They are simply 
acknowledgement tokens (Jefferson, 1984; Schegloff, 1982).  These two points show 
that the CPO is treating the c-construction as the start of something rather than 
something complete. 
The third point to note is that after the intrusion of the ethics exchange the 
caller resumes with a reiteration of the c-construction.  This suggests that the c-
construction has a particular social-interactional function in the call.  The fourth 
point to note is that the caller continues after the acknowledgement token on 23 with 
a range of descriptions that suggest violence and abuse, and attend to the caller’s 
knowledge and motive for calling.   
What are c-constructions doing?  Let me offer some suggestions built on the 
observations above and then explore them with further examples. 
1. C-constructions are prefacing moves. 
C-constructions are hearably incomplete.  They are treated here by both caller and 
CPO as elements of talk that project a possibly extended narrative.  The 
acknowledgement tokens treat this as, at least potentially, to include institutionally 
relevant issues that are to come in the extended telling.  
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2. C-constructions display the caller’s (appropriate) stance.  
These constructions show their attitude toward the object of the narrative, typically 
some kind of abuse.   The topic is treated as serious, potentially damaging or 
upsetting.  Conversely, and relevantly here, they are not treated as things that the 
callers feel good about, are entertained by, or get pleasure or sexual excitement from.  
The c-construction is the caller’s first opportunity to establish appropriate 
motivations for making the call.   
3. C-constructions project collaborative unpacking of the narrative. 
These constructions project collaborative unpacking in the sense that they do not 
start with a definitive claim about the status of the abuse.  Rather they invoke a 
concern (or similar ‘psychological’ item), which can be made more (or less) definitive 
in the course of talk with the CPO.  The initial stance is open with respect to the 
NSPCC actionability of what is to be described. 
A second example can provide further illustration.  Again this is very start of 
the call. 
Extract 2: WO Car witness 11.1.02 
CPO:  NSPCC child protection helpline.  1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
=good afternoo:n. 
Caller: .H hi good afternoon u:m: (0.4)  
I ↑have concerns about er:m the  
treatment of a chi:ld. ‘at I  
witnessed today: (0.2) u:m (0.1) 
a- this lunch ti:me. 
CPO:  O:kay: y- er: can I just stop you 
fer a mo:ment. 
((ethics exchange)) 
CPO:  Okay let’s have a chat about what  
your concerns are an then we can 
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13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
decide what the most: (.) appropriate  
course of action might be:. 
Caller: Yep >that’s fine< ↑basically >what happened 
was I was< sitting: >it’s ↑probaly about  
half an hour ago sitting in the car 
with my boyfriend. having< [some]::  
CPO:         [Mhm.] 
Caller: (.) lunch:, .hh in a car park in  
[Town], 
CPO:  Right. 
Note again the c-construction positioned immediately after the greeting exchange.  
The c-construction prefaces the report of witnessing the treatment of a child.  Again, 
the CPO treats the caller as developing a report rather than having performed a self-
sufficient action (‘can I just stop you’ – line 8).  It displays the caller’s stance to that 
treatment (explicitly ‘concerned’ rather than any relevant alternative).  There is a 
delicate mix of stance and neutrality here.  While concern characterises the caller’s 
stance, the descriptive term ‘treatment’ does not yet prejudge its nature (actual or 
moral).  It leaves this to be established collaboratively.   
This collaborative unpacking is explicitly formulated by the CPO after the 
ethics exchange.  She constructs what will go on as a ‘chat’ about your concerns that 
will lead toward a decision.  Glossing the talk as a ‘chat’  suggests that it will be 
collaborative and informal (Antaki, 2000).  Note also that the decision is constructed 
as something done together – ‘we can decide’ rather than ‘I will decide’.   In extract 2 
we saw that both caller and CPO use c-constructions.  However, even if the caller 
does not start with a c-construction in about a third of cases the CPO will use such a 
construction attributively as in lines 11-12 above.   
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An Analysis of Deviant Cases 
Further justification for the conclusions of this analysis is provided by a 
consideration of cases in of abuse reporting that do not use c-constructions.  If the 
analysis here is correct then they will either be performing some different activity or 
there will be managing the tasks done by the c-construction in a different way.  
Across the corpus there are three classes of deviant cases which do not start with c-
constructions: (1) calls where the caller is calling on behalf of someone else; (2) calls 
where the activity is other than reporting abuse (such as complaining about social 
services); (3) calls from identified professionals.  The opening of the first class of calls 
is pragmatically complex, but more focused on the caller’s warrant for speaking on 
behalf of another than the caller’s own stance on the putative abuse (see Potter & 
Hepburn, 2003, for discussion).  The second class of calls is typically less concerned 
with collaboratively unpacking a report, but in complaining about legal process or 
social services actions in what turns out to be an established case.  Such callers are 
less focused on collaborative unpacking as they already have a developed take on the 
nature of the abuse that is integral to their complaint.  The third class of calls is from 
professional callers.  I will focus on those here to illustrate how the analysis develops. 
There are a number of reasons why callers speaking from professional 
categories rarely use c-constructions.  First, such callers may be treated as entitled to 
know about abuse in a way that lay callers may have to earn such an entitlement 
(Potter, 1996; Sacks, 1992; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990).  So they do not present 
concerns to be jointly unpacked.  Second, and interestingly, their stance to the victim 
can be primarily institutional; they do not need to implicate psychological concern as 
a motive for calling or to manage their stake as someone who cares.  They have an 
occupational membership that cares for children.  Third, and conversely, their 
institutional stance to the victim works against various interests that callers with 
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personal relationships to the victim (estranged partner, neighbour) might have for 
fabricating information or making hoax calls.  For these reasons they have less 
reason to use c-constructions. 
Let me briefly consider an example of this kind.  Note the way the caller 
describes their identity as a ‘health visitor’ very early. 
Extract 3. JX Health visitor 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
((phone rings)) 
CPO:  Hello NSPCC can I help you? 
Caller: ↑Hel↓lo: I don’t know if I actually got 
(0.2) the right number I’m a- a health  
visitor.  
(0.2) 
Er[: : m] (.) in North Berwick. 
CPO:    [Yeah,] 
(0.3) 
Caller: .Hhh a::nd >I’ve actually g-< er:m  10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
>I’ve got a child on my caseload< 
he’s thirtee:n. 
(0.5) 
CPO:  Righ[t.] 
Caller:     [Wh]o er:m (0.3) i:s: (0.3) 
threatening to kill himse:lf he’s 
17 being aggressive (0.4) all sorts 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
of real problems.= 
CPO:  =◦Oh dear.◦ 
(0.6) 
CPO:  .Hh can ↑I [jus-] 
Caller:       [Erm ] 
  (0.2) 
CPO:  Before you go any further can I just ask  
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25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
  you a question. 
  ((ethics exchange)) 
CPO:  so you’ve got a chi:ld on your caseload 
  age thirtee:n. 
Caller: Yeah. 
  (0.2)
After noting some uncertainty about the right number, the caller presents as a ‘health 
visitor’ (lines 4-5).  She follows this with an organizational characterisation of her 
relationship to the victim: ‘I’ve got a child on my caseload’ (line 11).  Note also the 
way that after the ethics exchange the CPO repeats this organizational 
characterisation (line 27), orienting to (displaying an appreciation of) the caller’s 
institutional identity.  The presentation as a health visitor goes with the absence of 
much of the asymmetrical unpacking seen in calls from lay people.  The caller baldly 
lists specific problems: the child is ‘threatening to kill himself’ is ‘aggressive’.   The 
absence of c-constructions in cases such as these is further confirmation that c-
constructions have a specific practical function in the opening of calls from lay callers 
who are reporting abuse. 
Psychology,  Epistemology and Institutions 
Up to now I have focused mainly on examples that use the lexical item 
concerned.  However, I have used the name c-construction rather than concern 
construction because not all such constructions use this lexical item.  Indeed, what 
this analysis identifies is a practice that uses a family of ‘psychological’ constructions. 
Some of them uses ‘concern’ but others replace the term with some other term or 
some more complex construction that plays the same role in the talk.  That is, there 
are other constructions that work as (1) prefacing moves, (2) that display the caller’s 
stance and (3) that project collaborative unpacking of the abuse report in the same 
slot in the unfolding call.  For example, callers and CPOs can use constructions 
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including terms such as ‘worried’ or idioms such as ‘going out of my bleedin head’.  
Take a fresh example.  The following call comes via the NSPCC operator, which is 
why the CPO does not start with an identification-oriented answer in line 1, but 
simply with ‘hello’ (compare the extracts above).   
 Extract 4: MT Grandmother suspicions 
CPO:  Hello:. 1 
2 Caller: I: wonder if: er I’m- d- (0.3) 
  I may be barkin up the wrong tree:. 
  (0.3) 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Caller: .Hhh but erm (0.4) 
CPO:  .Dh could ↑I ↑just em: (0.4) tk  
  (0.2) a:sk you something [quick]ly, 7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Caller:      [ Yes,] 
((ethics exchange)) 
 (0.4) 
CPO:  .Hh so: wh- (0.5) s’I’m sorry I 
  interrupted you I [p’rhaps stopped the] 12 
13 Caller:    [ Right   no        ] 
CPO:  flow:, 14 
15 
16 
Caller: e- [i- it’s] just a- an a- (0.3) tk  
CPO:     [.Hhh   ] 
Caller: (0.2) i- it’s ↑probaly nathing but I 
  j- it’s a 
17 
gut feeling. 
  (0.3) 
18 
19 
CPO:  Yea[h : : ] they’re important aren’t  20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Caller:    [(I’ll)]  
CPO:  [↓they I] think. 
Caller: [ Erm:  ] 
  (0.8) 
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Caller: It’s a ↑little girl of (0.3) erm (0.5) 
  she’s (0.3) she’s 
25 
three, (0.3) 26 
CPO:  Yeah:.27 
The caller starts with a disclaimer about ‘barking up the wrong tree’.  This may 
already be a sign of trouble.  After the ethics exchange the caller evidences more 
trouble with a series of cut offs and false starts (line 15) and a further disclaimer – ‘its 
probably nothing’ (line 17).  It is only here that the caller produces the c-construction 
– ‘it’s a gut feeling’.   Note that it does not use the word ‘concern’, but it does invoke a 
‘psychological state’.  Perhaps because the false starts and disclaimers indicate she is 
in some difficulty the CPO responds supportively (‘they’re important aren’t they’ 
lines 20-22).  The call continues with a more or less standard collaborative unfolding 
of a possible abuse narrative.  We can the see this c-construction prefacing what is to 
come and initiating the collaborative unfolding.  The ‘gut feeling’ construction on its 
own may not display the caller’s stance – however, this may be part of the reason 
why ‘its probably nothing’ is added.     
The general argument here, then, is that there is a class of c-constructions 
which can include terms such as ‘worried’, or more elaborate constructions such as 
‘I’m going out of my bleeding head’ or ‘it’s a gut feeling’.  Why should these other 
constructions be used rather than the more standard ‘I’m a bit concerned…’?  This is 
not an easy question to answer without further systematic study of these 
constructions, probably focusing on the kind of interactional environment they might 
appear in.  Nevertheless, the specific constructions used are likely to reflect the fine 
tuned way in which words are drawn on to do particular actions in particularly 
interactional and institutional contexts.  They are part of the pervasive indexicality of 
conversation that ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts have done so much 
to explore (see Heritage, 1984, for summary).  For example, in the case of Extract 
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Four the ‘gut feeling’ (particularly in the context of the caller’s disclaimers about her 
knowledge) hearably projects some shortcomings of the narrative to be delivered.  
And indeed, the caller has some trouble in explaining the precise nature of the 
feeling.  The ‘gut feeling’ construction is not just clumsiness, but projects a specific 
and finessed accountability for the claims to be delivered in the immediately 
following part of the call. 
More broadly, we can understand the value of this set of psychological 
constructions in terms of the institutional role of the helpline.  One way of thinking 
about this is in terms of the different trajectories that the calls might take.  At one 
extreme the trajectory of the call comes to focus increasingly on the object – an 
abused child, an attack or incident, and its features.  Such calls become less and less 
about the caller and more and more about features of persons and events (bruises, 
addresses, family relationships) that will be needed for social services or the police to 
follow up on the call.  At the other extreme, the trajectory of the call comes to focus 
increasingly on the caller and his or her psychology.  It will come to centre on the 
‘psychological stuff’ of worries, anxieties, misunderstandings and misperceptions and 
may involve personal moves of reassurance.  The c-construction provides an orderly 
start to the calls for either of these trajectories or alternatives that mix elements of 
both.   
From the point of view of the basic institutional practices of the NSPCC, the c-
construction manages a fundamental epistemological asymmetry.  On the one hand, 
with respect to the call, the caller knows about the particular events and actions that 
they are phoning in about and the CPO does not.  The CPO is crucially dependent on 
that knowledge.  On the other, with respect to the call, the CPO knows about the 
procedures of child protection work, the policies of the NSPCC, what reports are 
appropriately actionable and so on.  A referral will not be made unless the CPO 
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assesses it as appropriate.  The c-construction is a superb way of dealing with the 
potential troubles that this asymmetry throws up.  In projecting an unpacking of 
concerns, worries, or gut feelings the caller lets the child protection appropriate 
status of what will be reported be decided by the CPO.  The CPO is treated as the 
person who knows about child protection, reliable signs of abuse, social services 
work practices and so on and can decide on appropriate actions.   
The situation parallels that of visiting the doctor.   Patients know about their 
symptoms – where it hurts and how much and so on – but the doctor knows about 
illnesses, injuries and the nature of treatment.   Patients orient to this by showing the 
doctorability of their problems – their good reasons for visiting the doctor – without 
prejudging the technical diagnostic issues that are the province of the doctor’s 
knowledge (Heritage, forthcoming).  By starting with a c-construction the caller to 
the NSPCC helpline prepares the way for a collaborative telling where the action-
worthy nature of the information can be assessed by the CPO. 
From the point of view of the CPO, the concern construction provides a basis 
for taking the abuse claims seriously, without either assuming or questioning their 
truth or appropriateness for the helpline.  In this way, c-constructions offer a special 
kind of neutrality.  In particular, they head off potentially troubling sequences where 
the caller asserts the existence of some abuse and the CPO then asks the basis for 
that knowledge.  Such sequences might suggest rather more disaffiliative doubt or 
scepticism, as opposed to the collaborative coming-to-a-view that results from 
unpacking concerns. 
Discursive psychology  
What I have tried to do in this article is illustrate what is distinctive about a 
discursive psychological approach and how that approach could provide a new way of 
considering the relationship between psychology and institutions.  Rather than 
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considering psychological phenomena as mentally encoded entities and processes the 
focus is on psychological terms and orientations being used to do things.  Here I have 
shown how c-constructions are drawn on to do the work of the NSPCC helpline by 
both callers and CPOs, and how they manage a number of potential problems that 
arise in this work.   
To end with, it is important to emphasise three things.  First, the focus on the 
practical role of psychological phenomena does not make their psychological status 
any less relevant or important.  It is precisely the role of the notion of ‘concern’ to 
both index the individual speaker and her or his stance, and the object of the 
concern.  This kind of analysis starts to capture what kind of thing it is to be a person 
in interactional terms and how that personhood is accountably related to unfolding 
practices.  Second, this focus on psychological phenomena does not require that 
psychological states and processes of some kind do not exist.  Rather it suggests that 
the study of such things is likely to benefit from careful attention to the specific 
practices that people are involved in and the sorts of ‘competences’ that those 
practices require.   Third, as this study has illustrated, the analysis of these practices 
does not require a prior understanding of, or analysis of, cognitive phenomena.  
Discursive psychology can work as an autonomous field of study.  For more detailed 
discussion of these difficult issues see Edwards (1997) and Potter and te Molder 
(2005). 
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Appendix: Transcription Symbols 
[ ]   Square brackets mark the start and the end of overlapping speech. 
↑↓  Vertical arrows precede marked pitch movement. 
→ Side arrows are not transcription features but draw analytic attention 
to particular lines of text. 
Underlining Signals speaker's emphasis. 
CAPITALS Mark speech that is obviously louder than surrounding speech. 
°I know it,° Raised circles ('degree' signs) enclose obviously quieter speech. 
(.8)    Numbers in round brackets measure pauses longer than 0.2 seconds. 
(.)  A pause of 0.2 seconds or less. 
((text))  Additional comments from the transcriber.  
*Why?*  ((smiley voice)) Asterisks enclose characteristics of the speech which is 
described in the brackets. 
::: Colons show degrees of elongation of the prior sound; the more colons, 
the more elongation. 
hhh  Aspiration (out-breaths); proportionally as for colons. 
.hhh  Inspiration (in-breaths). 
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Ye:ah,  Commas mark weak rising intonation, as used sometimes in 
enunciating lists. 
Ye:ah. Periods (stops) mark falling, stopping intonation, irrespective of 
grammar. 
?  Question marks signal question intonation, irrespective of grammar. 
> < Enclosed speech is produced noticeably quicker than the surrounding 
talk. 
< > Enclosed speech is produced noticeably slower than the surrounding 
talk. 
=  Equals signs mark the immediate latching of successive stretches of  
  talk, with no interval. 
(...) This shows where some within-sequence, or prior within-turn, talk has 
been omitted from a data extract.  
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